Anxiety and Diminished Hope: The Potential Impact of Trump’s Presidency on Security in the Pacific Islands Region

Steven Ratuva

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Anxiety and Diminished Hope: The Potential Impact of Trump's Presidency on Security in the Pacific Islands Region

Steven Ratuva

Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

ABSTRACT

The election of Donald Trump as the next president of the US has caused much international consternation and anxiety. Reactions have been based on distrust and rejection of Trump's political ideology, behavioural disposition and unpredictable policy positions. His campaign speeches were filled with provocative utterances which were racist, sexist, homophobic, anti-environment and self-centred. This article examines some possible impacts of Trump's presidency on the Pacific island countries (PICs). The first issue refers to how Trump's proposed isolationist and militarisation policies may affect regional geopolitics. The two policies tend to contradict each other because while isolationism means pulling back on US economic and strategic presence in the Pacific, a reversal of the pivot to Asia-Pacific policy, militarisation implies greater strategic reach, regionally and globally. What does this seemingly contradictory approach mean for the PICs? Second, the article looks at the impact of Trump's climate change denial stance and the responses by PICs, given the fact that climate change is the single most significant foreign policy and development initiative of the PICs since their independence. The third issue deals with the potential impact of Trump's restrictive migration policies on remittance flow to the PICs and how these affect the small island economies and well-being.

KEYWORDS

President Donald Trump; Pacific island countries; isolationism; militarisation; migration; security; Pacific; Trans-Pacific Partnership; North American Free Trade Agreement; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation; the Paris Agreement

Introduction

Mr Donald J. Trump's election to the US presidency has sent ripples of unprecedented anxiety worldwide as people try to come to terms with Trump's challenge to mainstream politics and his unorthodox rhetorical populism based not so much on any coherent ideology but on nebulous and unpredictable pragmatism. It is the fear as well as lack of confidence and trust in his untested values which has raised anxiety in the minds of those who see globalisation, diversity, multiculturalism, environmental protection and interconnectedness as today's imperatives. At the time of writing, there is much speculation about what a new global geopolitical order might look like under Trump. Some see a Trump victory as signifying the demise of neoliberalism (Farrelly, 2016), although others argue that the 'death of neoliberalism' is inevitable anyway, and Trump has simply given it a stamp of approval.
(Jacques, 2016). With his disdain of global free trade as embodied in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in which the US has played a pivotal role, combined with his isolationist stance on foreign policy, it is not easy to gauge the exact form or shape that US global hegemony will take over the next four years.

For Pacific island countries (PICs), the thought of a Trump presidency is disconcerting. For instance, they rely somewhat credulously on global cooperation in their fight against climate change – undoubtedly the major human security issue for PICs at the present time. Yet Trump’s denial of climate change as a ‘Chinese hoax’ bodes ill for the future prospects of effective global action. This article provides a critical examination of Trump’s potential impact on three major security aspects in as far as PICs are concerned. These are: first, the geopolitical reconfiguration of the Pacific as a result of a potentially isolationist and nationalistic US foreign policy stance under Trump; second, the impact of the Trump presidency on the climate change issue; and third, the economic impact on PICs if Trump’s proposed restrictive migration policies are enacted.

At the time of writing, Trump has not been inaugurated as president, and thus some of the arguments are based both on making analytical connections about his election promises and potential policies and what the implications could be. Unsurprisingly, Trump has already announced his desire to withdraw from the TPP free trade agreement as he promised during his campaign. Although he appears to be backpedalling on some of his promises in the immediate wake of his electoral victory, he seems unlikely to back away from some of the most significant ones, including those that will have an impact on the Pacific region.

**Change in Pacific Geopolitics?**

The question of how geopolitics in the Pacific might change is a complex one. PICs do not exactly loom large in US foreign policy because of their low-level significance in the US’s global strategic and security priorities, but they are still important in the broader Asia-Pacific ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ paradigm. A supportive PICs group in the UN is also important for the US in terms of UN General Assembly votes and especially to keep competitors such as China and Russia in check. US fishing interests in the Pacific as well as potential deep sea mining and the importance of Pacific trade routes connecting Asia and the US are certainly important economic factors.

The Pacific is also home to two of the US’s major allies, Australia and New Zealand, who, over the years since the Cold War, have been entrusted with effectively looking after the Pacific on behalf of America as much as themselves. The establishment of the ANZUS Treaty after World War II by Australia, New Zealand and the US was part of the broader anti-Soviet stance, often referred to as the strategic denial policy, which was aimed at keeping the Pacific as an ‘American lake’ (Friedman, 2001). The biggest blow to this three-legged security stool was when New Zealand was suspended as a result of its nuclear-free policy under Prime Minister David Lange. Lange was also a major driving force behind the establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, targeted at French nuclear testing and other forms of nuclear activities in the Pacific. It was signed in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, on 6 August 1985 and entered into force on 11 December 1986. Naturally, the US was not happy with New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy, which effectively banned US naval ships from visiting New Zealand ports. This caused a diplomatic rift which took years, almost two decades, to mend.
At the end of the Cold War, the US no longer saw any direct ideological and strategic interests in the Pacific because its major competitor, the USSR, had disintegrated and thus its potential influence in the Pacific had waned. The US closed down all USAID (US Agency for International Development) offices in the Pacific, which had provided ‘chequebook diplomacy’ to keep the Soviets out of the region. Responsibility for the Pacific region was to be a largely Australian responsibility, the self-styled ‘deputy sheriff’ role (Fry and Kabutaulaka, 2008). After 9/11, Australia’s security interests expanded and embodied the entire South Pacific region, which was seen by some Canberra policy thinkers as a potentially dangerous ‘arc of instability’ consisting of actual or potential ‘failed states’ that could be used as a breeding ground for terrorists (Ratuva, 2008). This myth, however, was born more of racialised anti-Islamic paranoia than rational security analysis, and has been dismissed as ideological nonsense. The impact in terms of Australian aid and intervention in the Pacific was significant but not sufficient to keep China, the new ‘threat’, in check. Because of this perceived threat, the US re-established USAID officers around the broad Asia-Pacific region including the Pacific. The Pacific office was set up in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, and is responsible for 12 island countries altogether. This new interest in the Pacific, exemplified by Obama’s regional visit and Secretary of State Clinton attending the Pacific Island Forum in Cook Islands in 2012, was part of the new ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s increasing influence has compelled some to say that a new style of Cold War geopolitics was brewing but there is a strong argument to be made that the relationship between the US and China is largely economic and not strictly ideological as the Soviet–US Cold War was. China and the US depend on each other economically and both powers realise the potential danger of antagonising the other (Ratuva, 2014). Russia too has made new inroads into the Pacific, as have Indonesia and India. But the main issue relevant to the present discussion is: how will the Trump presidency affect these dynamics?

First, there is the possibility of the ‘pivot approach’ being replaced by a foreign policy stance driven by isolationism and nationalism which might see US interest in the Pacific being wound down significantly, either quite abruptly or, in a less dramatic scenario, over the next four years at least. This would mean that the vacuum left behind would be filled willingly by the ever-expanding Chinese presence which, through aid, mainly in the form of soft loans and investment, now pervades the entire PIC region. The Russians too, who may now see Trump as an ally, would be happy to strengthen their hold in Oceania. The only other threat to them would be China.

This narrative may seem somewhat simplistic in not considering the other aspects of Trump’s ideas, perhaps better described at this stage as spurts of random thought. For instance, Trump’s commitment to strengthening the US military may shape the whole geopolitical scenario in a substantive way, possibly even expanding the global reach and intensity of US militarism. The US Pacific fleet and naval bases may see a major revamp and thus contradict Trump’s commitment to isolationism. Historically, the US has used the Bikini and Enewetak Atolls (Marshall Islands) for nuclear testing, Guam and Hawaii as substantial military bases, Kwajalein Atolls (Marshall Islands) for missile range testing and, more recently, Darwin (Australia) as a base for US marines (Robie, 2015). There are other military-related bases in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Federated State of Micronesia and American Samoa, while both New Zealand and Australia host satellite communication centres as part of the US global spy network (Hager and Gallagher, 2015).
The strengthened US military would act as a ‘wall’ to keep unwanted elements out and protect America. While Obama’s foreign policy was to protect America through diplomatic appeasement and disengagement, Trump is expected to be more ideologically hawkish and militarily abrupt. Because of his cynicism about global trade, his framing of US foreign policy, which directly connects trade and strategic interests, may be downplayed. If Trump were to weaken trade with the Asia-Pacific region, there would be no need to protect the sea lanes between the US and Asia, an excuse often used to justify military build-up. The question is whether this would mean a reduction in the US Pacific fleet. The ‘pivot’ that was central to Obama’s policy in the region integrated both military and trade as part of a single foreign policy package. So the question is whether Trump’s isolationism would reduce US trade and strategic interests in the region.

Let us not forget, however, that Trump also wants a strong military and this may mean increasing the size and extending the reach of the Pacific fleet. This may undermine the policy of isolationism. This is one of the contradictions that Trump’s administration will need to deal with. Another possible scenario is that Trump’s mistrust and suspicions of China would help energise Russia, whose interest in the Pacific has been growing. Given the comradely sympathy between Trump and Putin, it is possible that Russia and the US may become allies in containing the Chinese in the Pacific. This may sound highly speculative, even ludicrous at the present time, but Trump’s ability to do and say the unthinkable needs to be kept in mind. Again, all this might require a rethink about an isolationist policy. Withdrawal of US interest from the Pacific and indeed other parts of the world could spell the end of the US imperialist hegemony as we know it. One of the reasons for US ‘greatness’ is its unrivalled global military presence. Withdrawal into isolationism would not ‘make America great again’, but rather weaken superpower status significantly.

It is probably fair to say that these potential contradictions would undermine any Trump reform of the global order. For the PICs, even if the US largely withdraws from the Pacific, the impact on regional geopolitics may not be as much as some may fear. On the other hand, if Trump embarks on a remilitarisation path, then the Pacific will once again be host to intensified big power confrontation, perhaps with Russia and the US on one side and China on the other. Obama, Hawaiian-born, and thus in a way a Pacific Islander, had some knowledge of and empathy with the Pacific. This can scarcely be said about the New York-centric Trump, whose knowledge about and interest in the Pacific is probably minimal. He may have few if any concerns about the fate of a far-flung island region unless, perhaps, it is seen as a potential location for Trump golf courses or resorts. But his policies on remilitarisation, if implemented, would no doubt have an impact on specific countries where there are US bases, as well as Pacific geopolitics generally.

**Climate Change: Survival versus Denial**

The election of Trump coincided with the global conference on climate change, COP22, in Marrakesh, Morocco. The delegates expressed disbelief and horror when the results showed a Trump victory, carrying with it the possibility of the Paris Agreement being torn up, as he had promised during his campaign. Fiji’s Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama, who will chair the next climate summit in Bonn, Germany, in 2017, made an emotional appeal: ‘I say to the American people: you came to save us then and it is time for you to help save us now’ (King, 2016). He then invited Trump to visit Fiji to see for himself the ongoing calamities
wrought by climate change (Mathiesen, 2016). At the same conference, Mattlan Zackhras, the Marshal Islands minister-in-assistance, expressed some hope that the US would not abandon the climate change process:

Is it going to be tough? Yes. I’m not going to sugarcoat it around this issue. Because they’ve been very active and part of the high ambition coalition and a lot of the initiatives that were reached this year as part of the Paris agreement … We need a key player and one of the largest emitters in the world to be part of this process and without them it’s going to be a bit difficult. (Mathiesen, 2016, p. 1)

The ‘key player’ everyone expects to be in the driving seat for climate change is the US. Under Obama, the US had taken a leading role, despite opposition from within the US itself from many sceptical conservative Republicans and corporations with vested interests who invoked various controversial ‘scientific’ explanations to rebut the climate change arguments (Goreham, 2013).

The PICs have been at the forefront of the global war on climate change and their unwavering persistence in the last few years has paid off in terms of making the plight of Pacific peoples known worldwide. The images beamed across the world through the internet and television of natural calamities such as category five cyclones, sea-level rise, climate migration, coastal erosions, coral bleaching and droughts have raised consciousness about an impending doomsday scenario. As part of the build-up towards COP21 in Paris in 2015, the Pacific leaders demanded immediate and significant action to cut greenhouse gas emissions during the Pacific Islands Forum leader’s summit in Port Moresby in September 2015, although the two wealthiest and most industrialised countries, Australia and New Zealand, were ambivalent. In opening the leaders’ meeting, the president of Palau emphasised that ‘small island states may be perceived as small, but they are in fact pioneers and trailblazers in restoring balance to the earth’ (Radio New Zealand, 2015).

The Paris Agreement, signed by 175 countries in the world, was seen as a great victory for PICs as it recognised that ‘climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet’. It was doubly celebrated because it also recognised the link between climate change and certain human values cherished by Pacific peoples. It ensured that parties should ‘respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity’ (UN, 2015, p. 24). It further stated that applied policies on climate change should also recognise ‘traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate’.

PICs emerged from COP21 anticipating that the principles laid out in the Paris Agreement would be supported by the most economically and militarily powerful country in the world. This scenario, however, is now far less likely. Assuming that Trump will follow through in withdrawing from climate change commitments, one of his first acts would be to withdraw the US funding pledge to the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Of the US$10.3 billion equivalent in pledges by 43 states, the US was the largest with US$3 billion, followed by Japan with US$1.5 billion and the UK with US$1.2 billion (Green Climate Fund, 2016). Already, PICs have put much faith in the GCF to provide part of the solution to their plight, and withdrawal of US support would clearly be a major blow.
Even ahead of a reduction in GCF funds, there is already frustration regarding the bureaucratic restrictions and conditionality of the application process. Attempts by PICs to acquire grants from the GCF have been hindered by ‘red tape and requests for scientific information which states cannot provide’ (Arkin, 2015, p. 1). Moreover, instead of applying directly, they are required to apply through one of the accredited international or regional agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, a situation that former president of Kiribati and a leading voice in Pacific climate activism, Anote Tong, referred to as ‘a paradox’ (Lo, 2016, p. 1). Furthermore, Trump’s anti-immigration policy could mean that Pacific people escaping the destructive effects of climate change may not be able to enter the US, which, until now, has been seen as a welcoming destination (Johnson and Zacarias, 2016). Given the reluctance of New Zealand and Australia to take in climate change migrants, PICs facing inundation due to climate change will need to look for alternative destinations regionally (such as Fiji, which has promised to open its doors to future climate migrants) and internationally.

For many PICs, the inability of the global community to address their climate change challenges is tantamount to a death sentence, and Trump’s threat to tear up the Paris Agreement appears as an epitaph to the end of the world as we know it. Much now rests on the distant hope that Trump, through sound advice, may change his mind. But the presence of climate change denialists in his advisory team does not bode well for such an outcome. Any attempt by the US to derail the climate change agenda, which has been the single most critical issue among the PICs since independence, would be seen as a travesty of natural justice and a direct threat to their security. This is aptly summarised by the COP22 communiqué by world leaders on 17 November 2016, which asserted ‘that climate change is already a major threat to the enjoyment of fundamental human rights and to the maintenance of peace and security that also requires appropriate attention and action by relevant organs of the United Nations’ (Marrakech Communiqué, 2016).

### Migrants and Remittances

Trump’s promise to insulate the US from the rest of the world runs counter to the ideals of globalisation, which see national boundaries and sovereignty as barriers to interaction, diversity and cultural understanding. This is consistent with Trump’s ideologies of isolationism, monoculturalism and nationalistic populism, which were the basis for ‘making America great again’. Two proposed means of achieving this are restriction of migration and the expulsion of ‘undocumented’ migrants. Until now, US immigration policy has been one of the most liberal in the world (especially compared with Australia and New Zealand) and the Pacific islands diaspora in the US, the source of substantial remittances, would be directly affected by possible policy change, with a significant follow-on impact on the PICs’ economies and therefore local livelihoods.

The US census of 2000 showed that out of a population of 281.4 million, 400,000 or 0.1% were self-defined as Pacific Islanders (US Government, 2001). Since then, the increase in the Pacific Islander population has been substantial. During the 2012 census, of the 312.8 million Americans, 1.2 million or 0.3% self-identified as Native Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islander. Of a total of 1.3 million Pacific Islanders, 14% were native Hawaiians, 13% were Samoans, 10% were Guamanian or Chamorro, 5% were Tongan, 3% were Fijian and 2% were Marshallese. The undocumented population is not captured in the census figures but
it is estimated that there are about 1,532,304 undocumented Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPI), representing about 13.9% of the total undocumented population (Wong, 2015).

Among the AAPI, poverty is highest among Hmong Americans, Bangladeshi Americans, Samoan Americans and Tongan Americans. Poverty rates for native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders are at around 20.4% and child poverty is at 27%. This is relatively high but still less than for blacks and Native Americans. Many Pacific Islanders work in semi-skilled areas of the service industry and are thus very vulnerable to sudden changes in the economy (Ramakrishna and Ahmed, 2014). For instance, during the 2008 global crisis, many Pacific Islanders lost their jobs, obviously affecting their ability to send remittances home (Kida, 2009; UNDP, 2012). But since things have begun to improve, remittances have been rising steadily. In 2011, they amounted to around US$160.4 million (F$332 million), rising to US$190.6 million (F$395 million) in 2012, US$203.4 million (F$421 million) in 2013 and US$209.4 million (F$434 million) in 2014 (World Bank, 2016). Of the US$133.5 billion worth of remittance sent worldwide from the US in 2015, the figures for individual PICs were: New Caledonia (US$57 million); Fiji (US$52 million); Tonga (US$47 million); Marshall Islands (US$25 million); Samoa (US$20 million); and Kiribati (US$8 million); while Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu received around a million each. Furthermore, the values of remittance for these countries’ economies are among the highest in the world in terms of percentage of gross domestic product, with Tonga at 27.1%, Samoa 17.5%, Marshall Islands 13.7%, Tuvalu 10.6%, Kiribati 9.6%, Federated States of Micronesia 7.4% and Fiji 5.1%.

The heavy reliance of PICs on remittances suggests strongly that restriction of migration into the US and expulsion of undocumented Pacific Islander migrants will have a devastating effect on the island economies. Poverty levels would rise significantly through the loss of remittances to households and diminished purchasing power would have an impact on local demand. The smaller PICs would also find it difficult to absorb the large number of people returning home. These factors would require island governments to expend more of their already limited resources on social protection programmes to alleviate poverty and receive returning immigrants. The demand for aid and financial assistance among PICs generally would surge, almost certainly increasing debt levels, noting that Chinese aid is mainly in the form of soft loans rather than grants. In PICs already under stress from environmental and existing economic, social and political challenges, basic human security needs would clearly be further compromised.

Conclusion

Among the PICs, the US has benefited from its historic image as a saviour during World War II. Since then, Peace Corp. volunteers, apart from practical work on the ground, have been seen as modern day missionaries preaching the gospel of a great nation. The impact of US culture through Hollywood, music, TV, fashion and other forms of cultural expressions has further enhanced its image, especially among the younger generation. Taken together, these projections of soft power have been effective in boosting the image of the US in the region over the years. And while there have been alternations between Republicans and Democrats over the years, their policies – including foreign, immigration, trade, etc. – have been fundamentally similar, despite some differences in emphasis and priority.
Trump’s presidency, however, will almost certainly see a major paradigm shift as he strives to substantiate his campaign claim to be very different from mainstream politicians from either side of the political divide in the US. At a practical level, the most significant changes for Pacific Islanders would be in relation to climate change, migration policies and a possible disengagement from international affairs generally, all of which have implications for security in the region, as discussed above. It is less clear how his apparent rejection of the neoliberal globalisation agenda will affect PICs. Although the TPP was not directly linked to PICs, they are implicated indirectly through Australia and New Zealand, the PICs’ largest trading partners. Overall, then, it seems that if the human security outlook for the Pacific islands was uncertain before, a Trump presidency makes it much more so, engendering little but anxiety and diminished hope among the people of the region.

References


